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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
CHESTER MATHIS, 
Appellant. 
No. 8375 
CASE 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT 
On June 18, 19 57, appellant was con vic ted of 
a crime in the District Court of Salt Lake County and 
sentenced to a term in the State prison (R 93). From 
the verdict and judgment rendered thereon, appellant 
appeals to this court and assigns the following: 
1. Error of the Court in granting the State a 
continuance without a showing as provided by law. 
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2. Error of the Court in over-ruling appellant's 
objection to the impanelling of the jury. 
3. Error of the Court in over-ruling appellant's 
objection to the introduction of testimony. 
4. Error of the Court in denying appellant's 
motion in arrest of judgment. 
To sustain this appeal and reverse the judgment, 
the appellant relies on the folowing: 
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW 
I 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW MEANS, THE PROCEDURE 
PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE TRIAL 
OF ACTIONS. 
Henderson vs. State, 126 P. 840 
II 
WHEN A CRIMINAL ACTION IS CALLED FOR TRIAL 
IN UTAH, NO CONTINUANCE MAY BE HAD EX-
CEPT UPON A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE BY 
AFFIDAVIT. 
Sections 11 and 12, Article I, U tab Constitution 
Section 1, 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution 
Section 77-29-1 Utah Code, 1953 
Section 77-24-18 Utah Code, 1953 
State vs. Hartman, 119 P2 112 
Finnely vs. State, 228 P 1003 
State vs. Williams, 163 P 1104 
In Re Begerow, 65 P 828 
Arrowsmith vs. State, 175 SW 545 
Logan vs. State, 234 SW 493 
People vs. Buckley, 47 P 1009 
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III 
A VOLUNTARY FISHING TRIP ON THE PART OF 
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR DELAYING THE TRIAL. 
State vs. Fairclough, 44 P2 692 
State vs. Taylor, 207 P 746 
In Re: Begerow, 65 P. 828 
Hernandez vs. State, 11 P2 35 6 
Neven vs. Nev-en, 154 P 78 
State vs. Keefe, 98 P 122 
State vs. Freshwater, 85 P 447 
State vs. Williams, 163 P 1104 
State vs. Brewer, 158 P 1094 
Arrowsmith vs. State, 175 SW 545 
People vs. Flynn, 26 P 1114 
Musgraves vs. State, 106 P 544 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW MEANS, THE PROCEDURE 
PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE TRIAL 
OF ACTIONS. 
In Henderson vs. State, due process is defined by 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court as follows: 
"In criminal cases in a State Court due pro-
cess of law means a trial in a court of competent 
jurisdiction before an impartial judge and jury, 
or before a judge alone, upon an accusation, 
either by indictment or information, as the State 
may provide, charging the accused of the viola-
tion of some State law, of which accusation the 
accused must have notice in time to enable him 
to prepare for trial. The trial must proceed 
according to the established procedure or rules 
of practice in such State applicable to all such 
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4 
cases.'' 
To elaborate further upon this question would be 
a reflection upon the intelligence of this Court, so we 
proceed to a consideration of the main problems. 
II 
WHEN A CRIMINAL ACTION IS CALLED FOR TRIAL 
IN UTAH, NO CONTINUANCE MAY BE HAD EX-
CEPT UPON A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE BY 
AFFIDAVIT. 
The substantive question presented by this ap-
peal, is that appellant's conviction was obtained by 
violating his constitutional rights. 
On May 17, 19 57, appellant was duly arraigned 
on an information charging him with a crime, to 
which he entered his plea of not guilty, and trial was 
set for June 11th to follow in order (R 6). Thereafter 
on May 21, the Clerk of the Court set the trial for 
June 5th at 1 0 o'clock A.M. and notified the respec-
tive parties thereof, pursuant to the rules of the Court. 
On June 4th, a supeona was issued for State witness-
es and the sheriffs return shows that this supeona 
was recalled (R 7). 
On June 5th at 10 o'clock A.M., appellant ap-
peared in Court with his counsel ready for trial, and 
the prosecuting attorney appeared and orally moved 
the court for a continuance stating that the complain-
ing witness was in Yellowstone Park. No show-
ing of any kind was made or offered by affi-
davit or otherwise, to which motion the appellant 
objected. The appellant's objection was over-ruled, 
and the state's motion for a continuance granted 
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(R 8). 
On June 18, the case was again called for trial 
at which time the appellant objected to the impanelling 
of the jury, which objection was over-ruled by the 
Court (R 12). 
After the jury had been impanneled, appellant 
objected to the taking of any testimony, which objec-
tion was over-ruled (R 14). At 4:25 P.M., that 
same day, the jury returned its verdict finding the ap-
pellant guilty (R 10). 
On June 21st, appellant filed his motion in arrest 
of judgment (R 110), which motion was overruled, 
and appellant sentenced to a term in prision (R Ill). 
Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
provides, in substance, that all Courts shall be open, 
and every person shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecesary delay, and section 12 provides, in sub-
stance, that persons accused of crimes shall have a 
speedy public trial. 
In Arrowsmith vs. State, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee said: 
"A speedy trial within the constitutional 
guarantee, means a trial as soon after indictment 
as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence 
prep~re f?r it, wit~out needless delay, having 
1n v1ew 1ts regulattons and conduct by fixed 
rules of law." 
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People vs. Buckley is a California case wherein 
it is said: 
"A speedy trial does not mean at once, 
but with all convenient dispatch, and implies 
courts in which a trial may be had. No doubt it 
also implies reasonable time for the state to 
provide courts and juries, and to procure wit-
nesses. It imposes, however, a special duty upon 
the state with reference to such cases, and, if the 
duty is not performed, the prosecution should 
be dismissed ... the mere statement of the 
judge that the court has been otherwise engaged 
does not show good cause." 
The 14th Amendment prohibits any state from 
depriving any person of his liberty, except by the pro-
cedure provided by the legislature, or other law making 
body. 
Pursuant to these constitutional provisions, the 
legislature enacted the code of criminal procedure, all 
of which was adhered to until June the 5th, at which 
time the State discovered that its main witness was 
absent. The legislature was wise enough to anticipate 
such situation and provide a remedy therefor, as 
follows: 
Section 77-24-18 provides: 
"After his plea, the defendant shall be en-
titled to at least two days to prepare for trial, 
but the time of the trial shall not be postponed 
for a longer time than the court may deem 
imperative." 
"Section 77-29-1. When an action is 
called for trial, or at any time previous thereto, 
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the Court may upon sufficient cause. shown by 
either party by affidavit, direct the tnal be post-
poned to another day of the same or to the 
next term. But the Court shall not postpone 
the trial for a longer time than may be neces-
sary." 
In State vs. Hartman, this Court construed this 
section with the following language: 
"In the case at bar, no affidavit was made, 
oral statements were given in open court, and 
the Court ruled: When you seek a continuance 
because you haven't got a witness here, it is 
necessary that the court pass upon the material-
ity of the testimony. The testimony must be 
material, there must be some showing of that 
kind." 
In People vs. Buckley it is said: 
"No diligence was shown to procure the 
attendance of the witness. Certainly the state-
ment of the witness that it would be a hard-
ship to require him to come from Sacramento 
was a poor excuse for continuing the case 3 3 
days while the defendant was in jail ... The 
benefit of this constitutional guarantee cannot 
be denied on such flimsy showing.'' 
After reviewing constitutional and statutory pro-
visions similar to ours, the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa in Finnely vs. State, said: 
"A party charged with crime has the co-
stitutional right to a speedy trial, and the Court 
has no discretionary power to deny him a right 
so important. It was enough for the defendant 
to show that the time fixed by the statute after 
information filed had expired, and that the cause 
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was not postponed on his application. If there 
was any cause for holding him for a longer time 
:V~~hout trial, it was for the prosecution to show 
lt. 
In this case, the defendant filed a demand for 
trial on April the 3rd, requesting a trial at that term 
of Court, but it seemed that the court on its own mo-
tion refused the defendant's request and set the trial 
for the following term, and in discussing the consti-
tutional requirements in criminal cases, the Court con-
tinued: 
"The State wholly failed to meet the re-
quirements of a showing that a continuance was 
necesary. The burden, under the circumstances, 
was upon the State. 
"These constitutional and statutory rights 
are designed to prevent prosecutions and capri-
cious delavs in criminal trials, in which the ac-
cused, whether innocent or guilty, might be 
imprisoned or detained under bond indefinitely. 
On the other hand these provisions are not de-
signed to hamper the State in the prosecution 
of criminal cases. Where no showing for delay 
is made by either party the presumption arises 
that the delay was necessary or that it was due 
to the desire of the accused. But where the ac-
cused insists and keeps insisting upon a speedy 
trial, without any showing made by the 
State justifying a delay, that presumption does 
not exist. The adoption of the contrary rule 
of judicial construction would render the stat-
utes and constitutional provisions relative to a 
speedy trial nugatory." 
In State vs. Williams, the defendant filed an affi-
davit in substance, that he was impecunious and that 
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he was unable to proceed to trial without certain wit-
nesses named therein and the court held that such affi-
davit was not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the statute, stating: 
"'The defendant's Affidavit does not, in our 
opinion, appear to be of suficient merit to have 
justified the court in granting the motion." 
In the case at bar, after the appellant's motion in 
arrest of judgment had been denied and after the de-
fendant had been sentenced to a term in the State 
Prison, the District Attorney appeared in Court and 
attempted to justify the record by testifying in sub-
stance, that at the time he issued the subpeonas the com-
plaining witness was in Yellowstone park and that by 
reason of her absences the State could not proceed. See 
(R 116). 
It is the position of appellant that such showing 
came too late. 
In Logan vs. State, it is said: 
"'An affidavit for continuance is of no ef-
fect when filed after defendant has been tried 
and con vic ted.'' 
We will discuss the sufficiency of this showing in 
the next proposition. 
In discussing the meaning of the constitution and 
statutes similar to ours, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in, in re: Begerow, said: 
"'It must be remembered that in construing 
o.ur declaration of rights there is no presump-
tion that the government or its officers will act 
justly, but the contrary. These sections imply 
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possible oppression, and are designed to enable 
the victim to assert his rights, even as against 
the government. The very first section in that 
chapter of our constitution asserts that the right 
of all men to enjoy and defend, life and liberty 
is inalienable. Then follow 12 sections, all 
calculated to secure to individuals this right, as 
against the government. To the same end, sec-
tion 13 declares the right to a speedy, public 
trial. This certainly has no other function than 
to protect those accused of crime against pos-
sible delay, caused by wilfull oppression or neg-
lect of the State or its officers. For, no doubt, 
persons apprehended upon suspicions have suf-
fered long imprisonment merely because they 
were forgotten. The declaration of rights dif-
fers from the great English charter, in that it is 
not an assurance to the individual from a sov-
ereign, but it is a command and limitation of 
power upon the State officials by the people who 
created the form of government. Either is a 
recognition of the fact, that the State cannot 
rightfully hold in prison even an accused person 
longer than is necessary that he may be tried, 
befo:.:;: L ~al and judgment rendered ... 
"It only remains to say that the Statute 
does not authorize the state or its officers to 
hold an accused person in imprisonment unnes-
sarily, even for 60 days. As already stated, 
when the prosecution is begun, the state be-
comes a party litigant. And as such, must dili-
gently prosecute its case. No unnecessary delay 
againt the will of the defendant is to be allowed 
to it. The defendant is discharged from 
custody." 
III 
A VOLUNTARY FISHING TRIP ON THE PART OF 
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THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR DELAYING THE TRIAL. 
It is the contention of the appellant that even had 
an affidavit been made as provided by statute, the 
facts as evidenced by the record would not constitute 
sufficient cause to justify a continuance. 
In Hernandez vs. State, the trial court continued 
the trial over July and August stating as its reasons 
therefor the following: 
~'There is now and has been for some 1 0 
or 15 years a rule in this court that no jury 
trial shall be held during July and August and 
this Court was following the rule of the Court.'' 
In reversing a conviction had at the trial, and 
ordering the defendant discharged, the Supreme Court 
of Arizona, said: 
HObviously, the good cause shown was the 
custom of the Court not to hold jury trial dur-
ing July and August. Does this satisfy the stat-
ute? The question of good cause has been be-
fore the courts of many of the states and the de-
cisions are varying. We have found none nor 
have we been cited any that are strictly on all 
fours with the case at bar. We think, however, 
the principal applicable is well stated in the case 
of ex parte Caple 58 Miss. 558, as follows; a 
judge has no right upon such an issue to consult 
the desires or interests of particular classes of 
the community, so long as there remains one 
prisoner in custody who demands to be tried 
not even to subordinate the right of the impris~ 
oned to the mere wishes of the entire com-
munity. There must be some grave public ne-
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cessity to warrant the prolongation in confine-
ment of those who demand a speedy trial which 
the constitution guarantees the humblest citi-
zen. 
"No rule or custom of court can set aside 
a positive statute, especially when it involves 
the protection of a constitutional right conferred 
upon the individual citizen.tt 
Neven vs. Neven, is a Nevada case, wherein the 
defendant in a divorce action was also the guardian in 
a matter pending in another court. The trial in the 
action was a divorce proceeding pending in the District 
Court at Reno, and on the date set for the trial, the 
defendant's attorney made an application for a con-
tinuance based upon his affidavit stating that the de-
endant was in Elko, Nevada, looking after the guard-
ianship of his ward in the courts up there, and also 
that a delay in train service made it impossible for 
him to reach court in Reno in time for trial, and in 
discussing the good cause necessary to sustain a con-
tinuance, the Supreme Court of Nevada, said: 
"A party who is a material witness in his 
own behalf must have his testimony ready for 
use at the trial unless prevented from doing so 
by some obstacle which by the exercise of reason-
able diligence he cannot overcome, and the ob-
stacle should not be one which he has created by 
his own voluntary act. If he allows considera-
tion of business or pleasure or even regard his 
own health to call him away for a time when 
his suit is liable to be called for trial and there-
by loses the benefit of his own testimony he 
must suffer the consequences. A party must be 
held to the exercise of good faith and diligence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
and cannot be heard to complain if the failure 
to present his case results from an attem~t 
to subordinate the business of the Court to h1s 
own business engagements and convenience." 
In Taylor vs. State, the court granted the defend-
ant one hour in which to prepare a formal application 
for a continuance, and the attorney failed to prepare 
such an affidavit on. the ground that he had other bus-
iness pending in another court at the time and was 
not able to prepare the necessary application within 
one hour, and the Oklahoma Court held that the busi-
ness of the attorney in another court was not sufficient 
cause to grant a continuance. 
During the trial of the cause at bar, on cross-ex-
amination of the prosecutrix, beginning at ( R 56) , 
the following took place: 
Q. Where were you on June 5th? 
A. That was the day we were in Yellow-
stone. 
Q. When did you go to Yellowstone? 
A. The previous Saturday. 
9· . Did you advise the County Attorney 
or D1stnct Attorney that you were leaving 
town? 
A. No sir, I did not. 
Q. What was your purpose for going 
to Yellowstone? 
A. Just to rest and relax and fish· Jim 
was going up there on business. ' 
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The Court: You have that as an objec-
tion to all of the evidence. 
Mr. Oliver: Yes. 
Mr. Ronow: What this Witness does or 
does not do has nothing to do with the setting 
of cases; I could not reach her with a supeona. 
The Court: Over-ruled. 
It is quite clear that had a showing been made 
by the prosecuting attorney on June 5th, that show-
ing would have revealed what appears in this testi-
mony, that the witness voluntarily left the State to go 
on a fishing tr~p to Yellowstone Park, and such a 
showing would not have been sufficient cause to justi-
fy a continuance under the la'v cited above. 
State vs. Bre·wer is a Utah case, wherein the case 
was called for a trial on June 21st, at which time the 
defendant interposed a motion for a continuance sup-
ported by affidavit, claiming that a material witness 
lived outside the State and that he had used every pos-
sible mea~~ ~ .. ..1 :~:urc the p~·:.:s:nces of said witness at 
the trial. The court over-ruled the defendant's motion 
and upon appeal this Court said: 
"The record shows that the Court on May 
1st. made an order setting the case for trial. No 
claim \\ras made that defendant and his counsel 
were not advised of this order at the time it 
was made. The court over-ruled the motion for 
a continuance. On June 21st, the case was again 
called for trial and the defendant interposed 
another motion for a continuance. supported by 
affidavit in which he reiterated the facts set 
forth in the former affidavit. The Court over-
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ruled the motion. This ruling is assigned as er-
ror. As stated, it is not claimed, and the rec'?r~ 
does not, show, that defendant used any dih-
gence whatever to procure the attendance of the 
witness. Moreover, when the defendant was 
testifying in his own behalf, stated on cross-e:c-
amination that he never wrote a letter to the Wit-
ness· never received a letter from her; never 
sent' a telegram to her; never received a telegram 
from her, as stated in his affidavit." 
This case affirmatively holds that a showing of 
due diligence is required by affidavit before a contin-
uance is justified under the statute above quoted. 
In the case at bar (R 56) the record shows that 
the complaining witness left town for Yellowstone 
Park on the Saturday previous to June 5th, which 
was June the 1st. At (R 6) the record also shows that 
on May 17th, this cause was set for trial for June 11th 
in turn. Thereafter, and in conformity with the rules 
and general practice of the Court, the clerk set the 
case definitely for trial on June 5th, and notified the 
respective counsel thereof on May 21. This ad-
vised counsel of such setting at least 15 days prior 
to the time the trial was to begin, and notwithstand-
ing this notice the record does not disclose, and the 
prosecuting attorney does not claim that he made any 
effort whatsoever to notify or otherwise inform the 
witnesses of this trial until June 4th, when a subpeona 
was issued. There was at least 10 days prior to June 
1st, when this particular witness was in the jurisdic-
tion of the court and subject to supeona and nowhere 
in the record is there any showing of any kind indi-
cating any reason whatsoever for not notifying this 
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witness that trial was set for June 5th, and t-:quiring 
her presence, and in this we respectfully submit that 
the State has wholly and completely failed to 1 ake any 
showing of diligence or otherwise to justify ' contin-
uance over the objection of the defendant, and cer-
tainly the statute does not vest in the Court ar 1 power 
of discretion or authority to continue a trial without· , 
the showing required by the statute. 
Arrowsmith vs. State, is a Tennessee case wherein 
the defendant was charged on several indictments of 
several separate and distinct crimes and upon the con-
viction of one, the Court made the following order: 
~~Came the attorney general for the state, 
and, it appearing to the court that defendant is 
serving a term in the penetentiary, it is con-
sidered by the court that said cases be retired 
from the docket until the expiration of said 
sentence.'' 
In reversing a conviction on the second trial, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, said: 
"The penetentiary is not a place of sanctu-
ary, and an incarcerated convict ought not to 
enjoy the immunity from trial merely because 
he is undergoing punishment on ·some other 
judgment of guilt. Why sholil<fthere be a de-
lay in bringing him to trial on an indictment 
pending against him, a convict who has not yet 
completed the service of a previous sentence? No 
reason can be suggested for such delay in the 
case of a convict adjudged guilty of some other 
offense and actually in execution of a sentence 
thereunder that does not apply equally to an 
individual who has been indicted, but has not 
yet been tried.'' 
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Sta:te vs. Keefe, is a Wyoming case, wherein sylla-
bus 1 0 r~-ads as follows: 
·,rr 
''Under revised statute 18 9 9, sections 53 8 2 
ahH 53 8 3 requiring accused persons to be tried 
within specified times, accused imprisonment 
ir( tthe penitentiary for another offense does not 
excuse a delay in prosecution." 
In State vs. Hartman, this Court held that the 
deendant had not shown diligence, and in State vs. 
Fairclough, that the absence of defendant's main at-
torney in the trial of another cause does not constitute 
good cause for delay. 
In Musgraves vs. State, it is said: 
"No reason is given why process was not 
procured for the witness at an earlier date. The 
law requires diligence in these matters. A de-
fendant cannot sit still and wait until just be-
fore his trial before he begins to get ready for 
trial. He must be diligent. 
It just happens, in the case at bar, that the shoe 
is on the other foot. 
Back in the territorial days of this state in the 
case of People vs. Flynn, this Court held that im-
prisonment is no excuse for delay of a trial in a crim-
inal case. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown, herein, the procedure provided 
by the legislature for the trial of criminal cases in U tab; 
we have shown wherein those rules were not followed 
or obeyed in the trial in this cause; we have shown 
that business of counsel in another court is not good 
cause for delaying a criminal trial; that imprisonment 
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of defendant is no good cause for delay; that negligence 
in securing witnesses is not good cause for delay, that 
the custom of the court in not trying cases in the sum-
mer time is not good cause for delay; and that the priv-
ate business or pleasure of a party to the action is not 
good cause for delay. We have also shown wherein the 
State failed to make any showing whatsoever at the 
time it requested a continuance and that the showing at-
tempted to be made after trial, conviction and sentence, 
was untimely and too late. Assuming for the sake of ar-
gument, that such showing was timely, we have shown 
wherein it does not measure up to the standards of 
diligence and good cause required by law, and in this 
we respectfully submit, that if the delay in the trial 
of this case can be justified by the urge of the prosecu-
trix to relax and fish, then the legislature acted in 
vain in enacting Sections 77-24-18 and 77-29-1 of the 
penal code; that all of the decisions of the Courts of 
Last Resort in construing similar statutes have been 
written for little purpose and both our State and Fed-
eral Constitutions have become as sounding brass and 
tinkling cymbals. 
In this we respectfully submit that the conviction 
in this case should be reversed with directions to dis-
charge the appellant and dismiss the information. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER 
Attorney for Appellant 
3 09 Frick Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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